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The United States Proposal for a General 
Agreement on Trade in Services and its 
Preemption of Inconsistent State Law 
jeffry Clay Clark* 
On October 23, 1989, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) submitted a proposed General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS)l to the ninety-five member 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT)2 negotiating 
group on services.3 With this proposal, the United States took the 
first step toward establishing a multilateral framework of rules 
and regulations governing international trade in services. While 
the final form and scope of GATS is far from settled, the U.S. 
proposal is the starting point that many diplomats and business 
people have been anticipating. As the percentage of trade in 
services in relation to total trade steadily grows for the United 
States and other nations,4 so does the need for more uniform 
guidelines and standards of conduct. 
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul V. Gadola, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan; J.D. 1991, University of Michigan; A.B. 1985, University of 
Michigan. 
1 The text of GATS is reprinted in U.S. Proposal For A General Agreement On Trade In 
Services And U.S. Submission To GATT Negotiators On Agricultural Reform Released By Office 
Of u.s. Trade Representative Oct. 24, 1989,6 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1391 (Oct. 
25, 1989). 
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as amended, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 
AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS Vol. IV (Mar. 1969). Technically, the United States has not 
ratified GATT per se, but has given effect to its text through the Protocol of Provisional 
Application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. pt. 
5. The original GATT text can be found at 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
3 U.S. Presents 'Bold' Proposal Before GATT Services Meeting, USTR Hills Tells Reporters, 6 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1368 (Oct. 25, 1989). 
4 Cf Bernard M. Hoekman & Robert M. Stern, Evolving Patterns of Trade & Invest-
ment in Services 38-39 (rev. ed. Oct. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review) (maintaining that even better data 
is needed to track growth and flow of trade in services). See generally BRIAN GRIFFITHS, 
INVISIBLE BARRIERS TO TRADE (1975). 
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GATS would playa historic role alongside those international 
economic organizations that have come into existence since the 
end of World War II.5 Since their inception, these organizations 
have both eased economic tensions between nations and stream-
lined international trade and financial discourse. In particular, 
GATS would address serious service trade matters left unresolved 
since the political demise of the highly controversial International 
Trade Organization (ITO).6 Additionally, GATS would aid other 
international organizations in alleviating international economic 
tensions which have led to ruinous world-wide recessions, depres-
sions, trade wars, and military conflicts in the past. 
If an agreement on the USTR's GATS proposal is reached, 
however, its constitutionality may be challenged in U.S. courts. 
The question whether GATS preempts inconsistent state law 
would lie at the heart of such a challenge. As GATS purports to 
streamline international trade, it must necessarily erase domestic 
barriers to such trade.7 In order for GATS to preempt inconsis-
tent state law, the scope of the agreement must be within the 
constitutional reach of Congress and the President. 8 
5 These organizations include, among others, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and GATT. 
See infra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. The U.S. negotiators and drafters contend 
that GATS will be executed and enforced under the GATT network, and will not create 
a separate international economic organization. Interviews with Amy Porges, Associate 
General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan and Washington, D.C. (Mar. 13, and Apr. 5, 1990). Therefore, the scope of 
GATT itself will be widened immensely by the new service sector responsibilities. 
6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3206, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ORGANIZATION (1948) [hereinafter ITO Charter]. See infra note 14. 
7 The term "barriers" refers broadly to impediments to trade, including, for example, 
the lack of uniformity in state laws regulating trade. Telephone Interview with Margaret 
Wigglesworth, Executive Director, Coalition for Service Industries (Nov. 2, 1990) [here-
inafter Wigglesworth Interview]. Although the states have erected specific barriers, such 
as the vague statutory bans on international banking concerns operating in Arizona, 
Colorado, and Virginia, these obstacles are few and far between and relatively innocuous. 
Telephone Interview with William Hawley, Counsel for Government Affairs, Citibank, 
Inc. (Nov. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Hawley Interview]. 
8 There is no set constitutional or judicial formula spelling out the requirements for a 
treaty to preempt inconsistent state law. For a balanced, yet incomplete view, see RES-
TATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I, reporter's n.5 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The oft-repeated test of "intent to preempt" is not 
addressed in this Article. Courts have now turned to a result-oriented "occupied the field" 
approach, which is not applicable to GATS without schedules attached. This Article 
assumes an intent to preempt. Interview with Bonnie J.K. Richardson, Office of the 
USTR, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 6, 1990) (stating that GATS would preempt state law 
explicitly if necessary) [hereinafter Richardson Interview]. 
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This Article suggests that the V.S. proposal to harmonize world 
practices in trade in services can preempt state regulation of what 
has traditionally been defined as local commerce. Part I briefly 
explores the political-economic history leading up to the pro-
posed GATS. Part II defines GATS, not as a constitutional 
"treaty," but as a legislative form of international agreement that 
will have the same effect over inconsistent state law as a treaty. 
While there are no set schedules or agreed upon annexes defin-
itively identifying the precise service industries which will be af-
fected by GATS, Part III briefly considers potential targets of 
GATS and finds them all to be within the federal government's 
regulatory reach. 9 Part IV shows that V.S. courts have, by and 
large, held that the states are bound to similar international agree-
ments. Whether the agreements are trade-based or procedure-
based, multilateral or bilateral, V.S. courts have been inclined to 
rule on the side of national uniformity. Part V examines the 
private, state, and federal political forces affecting the future of 
GATS. This Article concludes that political obstacles, not legal 
questions, appear to be the greatest impediment to the successful 
completion of GATS. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED GATS 
During the latter stages of World War II, Allied leaders rec-
ognized that past economic and financial crises were partially to 
blame for the rise in fascist and "have-not" movements. Acting 
upon this recognition, these leaders set out to create a group of 
organizations and multilateral international agreements that 
would smooth out and defuse major economic and financial crises 
in the future. lO A core group of these international economic 
regulatory organizations and agreements became known as the 
Bretton Woods System. The most notable of the many institutions 
which trace their origins to the Bretton Woods Conference are 
9 This Article does not attempt to probe each individual target service sector for chinks 
in its Commerce Clause armor. It does, however, attempt to show that a broad Commerce 
Clause shadow falls over each service sector selected for review. 
IO U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 2866, Doc. No. 492, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS 
OF UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 927 (1948), cited in Gerald 
M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-Twenty-Five Years After, 23 STAN. L. REV. 235, 235 
n.l (1970). 
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF), II the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),12 and GATT. 
The IMF, the World Bank, and GATT have been the preem-
inent economic organizations in world trade since 1948.13 The 
international community also expected the ITO to play a major 
role in international economic affairs; indeed, it would have been 
dominant over GATT.14 When the U.S. Senate failed to approve 
the ITO Charter, however, GATT emerged as the leading insti-
tution for advancing the commercial ideals of World War II's 
capitalist victors. The IMF was created to repair the disintegrated 
world monetary system which had existed prior to the war,15 and 
the World Bank was designed to stimulate and support foreign 
investment. 16 The original purpose of GATT, however, was 
merely to support the ITO in reversing pre-war protectionist and 
11 [d. For a thorough description and analysis of the IMF, see 1-3 THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND 1945-1965 (J. Horsefield ed., 1969). 
12 The treaty establishing the World Bank was given domestic effect by the Bretton 
Woods Agreements Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 512 (1945) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 286-286x (1988)). 
IS Meier, supra note 10, at 236. 
14 See ITO Charter, supra note 6. The ITO Charter was negotiated and drafted between 
1946 and 1948. In early 1948, the ITO Charter was completed and the other signatories 
awaited the U.S. Senate's approval. The Charter was submitted to the Senate several times 
but was never approved. RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 371-78 
(1956). By the late 1940s, with a new Republican majority in the Senate, the aura of 
international cooperation which prevailed at the end of World War II had faded. [d. 
President Harry S Truman recognized the inevitable Senate rejection and announced 
that he would not resubmit the ITO Charter to the Senate. Dep't St. Release, Dec. 6, 
1950, reprinted in 23 DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1950, at 977. The ITO, for all practical 
purposes, was dead. 
15 See Meier, supra note 10, at 237. The crown jewel of the Bretton Woods System is 
the IMF. Established in 1944, the IMF has promulgated a detailed code for international 
financial conduct. Under IMF rules and regulations, nations are no longer able to disguise 
their monetary policies to achieve commercial gains. International Monetary Fund Agree-
ment, art. XX § 4, reprinted in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
SYSTEM (1984). National currency exchange controls have been curtailed. [d. at art. VIII, 
§ 2(a), art. XIX(i). Frantic monetary shifts to meet balance-of-payments shortages, which 
often led to domestic economic downturns, have been avoided. These balance-of-pay-
ments difficulties are now viewed as bilateral problems, not merely predicaments forced 
by the debtor nation. IMF policies transformed the world economy by putting an end to 
the random and unstable financial practices followed earlier this century. See generally 
GRIFFITHS, supra note 4. 
16 See Meier, supra note 10, at 237. The World Bank was established to contribute to a 
sustained high level of international investment. While the IMF is concerned with financial 
liquidity, the World Bank is devoted to the flow of long-term investment capital across 
national boundaries. See id. at 241. Initially devoted to the reconstruction of postwar 
Europe, the World Bank now provides assistance to developing countries. It emphasizes 
specific projects and supplementary private investment. 
1992] GATS AND STATE LAW PREEMPTION 79 
discriminatory trade practices that had spread during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. 17 
Upon the death of the ITO, GATT signatories set out to revise 
the agreement, as ratified by the United States, to allow a more 
flexible and independent approach to international trade. The 
GATT Contracting Parties18 sought to include a small operating 
council-the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC)19-
within GATT. As with the ITO, the Senate ultimately rejected 
the OTC. The Senate was not disposed to delegate its authority 
over U.S. foreign commercial policy to an international body.20 
The resulting absence of organizations such as the ITO and the 
OTC has left the international community reliant upon a GATT 
ill-prepared to meet the demands created by the growth of world 
trade in services. 
Until recently, governments and international economic ex-
perts considered the service sectors of national economies largely 
unimportant and peripheral,21 Today, however, a majority of 
western economists consider the emerging service industries to 
represent the developed world's economic future. 22 While the 
Bretton Woods System offers some stability in this evolving world 
economy, the stability it provides is not all-encompassing. 
Changes in financial and investment burdens may very well be 
met by the IMF and the World Bank. The shift in trade from 
goods to services, however, is not readily addressed by GATT. 
Indeed, while GATT has successfully tackled tariff barriers, it 
has a mixed record on other obstacles to trade.23 
The rise of service industries throughout the world economy 
has led to negotiations on trade in services at the Uruguay Round 
of GATT negotiations. Through its GATS proposal, the United 
States has been the strongest supporter of an agreement on trade 
in services. The proposal, for the most part, has been supported 
17 [d. at 237. 
18 The name "Interim Trade Committee" was changed to "Contracting Parties" to 
remove any connotations of a formal organization, thereby pacifying Senate reservations. 
JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 120 (1969). 
19 [d. at 51 & n.ll. 
20 john H. jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic 
Law, 66 MICH. L. REV. 249, 274 (1967). 
21 See, e.g., COLIN CLARK, CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS 6, 375 (1957); RAYMOND 
J. KROMMENACKER, WORLD-TRADE SERVICES: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE EIGHTIES 3-4 
(1984). 
22 See, e.g., Hoekman & Stern, supra note 4; KROMMENACKER, supra note 21. 
2' See generally Meier, supra note 10; JACKSON, supra note 18. 
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by developed countries such as Canada and Japan, and the Eu-
ropean Community.24 
While GATT is essentially concerned with trade in hard, tan-
gible goods, it has briefly addressed issues concerning trade in 
services. The never-ratified Havana Charter of the ITO, upon 
which GATT depended, provided that certain services would be 
recognized as substantial elements of international trade and that 
restrictive business practices affecting these services would be 
seen as having harmful results. 25 In the 1970s, during the Tokyo 
Round of GATT negotiations, a number of side agreements dealt 
directly or indirectly with services.26 The Subsidies Code27 and 
the Customs Valuation Agreement28 both refer to the services 
sector. More specifically, the Agreement on Government Pro-
curement, which applies to services incidental to the supply of 
products, provides that the signatories shall give early consider-
ation to extending the agreement to cover service contracts.29 At 
present, however, GATT does not regulate trade in services in 
any significant manner. 
In 1982, the United States proposed that GATT consider ne-
gotiating an agreement on trade in services as part of its work 
agenda. 30 GATT in turn asked the Contracting Parties to provide 
information on trade in services and barriers thereto.31 The "pro-
posal to consider" enhanced the prospects for a services proposal 
at the next negotiating round which began at Punta del Este, 
24 Developing countries, such as India and Brazil, have voiced reservations about GATS. 
See, e.g., GATT: Latin American, Caribbean Countries Offer Uruguay Round Services Agreement 
Proposal, 7 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 337 (Mar. 5, 1990); Office of Multilateral 
Affairs, Int'l Trade Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Uruguay Round Update 10 (Feb. 
1990). 
25 ITO Charter, supra note 6, at art. 53(1). 
26 See generally John H. Jackson et aI., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of 
Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REV. 267 (1982). 
27 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, XXIII of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp. 56 (1980) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1988». 
28 Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp. 116 (1980) 
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1988». 
29 Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp. 33 (1980) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988». 
30 GATT Ministerial Declaration of Nov. 29, 1982, GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 29th Supp. 9, 21-22 (1983). 
31 [d. Due to opposition from developing countries, the proposal was ultimately rejected. 
See Ernest H. Preegt, The GATT Trading System in Transition: An Analytic Survey of Recent 
Literature, 12 WASH. Q. 199,203 (1989). 
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Uruguay in 1986 and is currently underway.32 The first compre-
hensive initiative on trade in services was presented when the 
USTR submitted the GATS draft to the GATT Contracting Par-
ties in Uruguay on October 23, 1989. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFINITION OF GATS 
GATS will not be a treaty under the U.S. Constitution, although 
it will have the same effect as one. The procedures through which 
it will be concluded and implemented are not ones the Framers 
included in the Constitution. The traditional treaty ratification 
process is time-consuming and cumbersome, thus, the federal 
government has developed agreement implementation proce-
dures not enumerated in the Constitution. GATS is an example 
of one of these alternative methods: the Subsequent Congres-
sional Executive Agreement. 
The drafting history concerning the Treaty Clause is sparse. 
In general, the Framers were eager to abandon the haphazard 
treaty-making process in place under the Articles of Confedera-
tion.33 The Treaty Clause addressed their concerns. The Treaty 
Clause gives the power to make treaties to the executive branch, 
but only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate.34 
This process requires agreement between the President and the 
Senate, thereby assuring a check and balance of powers. While 
the executive branch carries the negotiating power, the end prod-
uct of such negotiations does not become enforceable until the 
Senate concurs. 
In addition to the Treaty Clause, other provisions of the Con-
stitution address how treaties and agreements may be reached, 
as well as their legal effect within the United States. For example, 
the Constitution declares that individual states may not make 
agreements without prior congressional approval,35 Additionally, 
the Supremacy Clause places treaties on a legal level above state 
32 The Uruguay Round of negotiations was formally launched on Sept. 20, 1986. GAIT 
Launches Uruguay Round as Consensus Reached on Services, Agricultural Trade, 3 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1150 (Sept. 24, 1986). 
33 LoUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 129 & n.2 (1975). Under 
the Articles of Confederation, Congress alone appointed negotiators, wrote their instruc-
tions, and finally approved or disapproved of the finished product. 
34 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
35 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
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laws and constitutions.36 While the Constitution does mention 
other types of international agreements and compacts, it does not 
explicitly distinguish them from treaties.37 Together, these 
Clauses form the entire constitutional procedural format for en-
acting, enabling, and upholding treaties. 
In the nineteenth century, the United States was quickly be-
coming a world economic, political, and military power, and 
therefore needed to make international compacts that would be 
honored and fulfilled. Political necessity led to constitutional cre-
ativity, and four treaty-like procedures emerged. Beyond the 
Treaty Clause, the federal government developed the use of the 
Treaty-Authorized Agreement,38 the Presidential Executive 
Agreement,39 and the Previous40 and Subsequent41 Congressional 
36 u.s. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
37 There may be an implicit denigration of "agreements" and "compacts," as these 
terms appear not in the Treaty Clause, but in article I, section 10, clause 3 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which is devoted to the negation and limitation of state power. 
38 Under a Treaty·Authorized Agreement, one treaty or international agreement gives 
either the executive or another body the power to enter into a similar international 
agreement. The primary treaty or agreement must have been ratified and consented to 
according to its own procedure. In other words, the primary treaty or agreement must 
be valid under the U.S. Constitution and U.S. law. The primary treaty or agreement must 
also still be in force; it cannot have been abrogated by the United States. Cf Charleton v. 
Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) (extradition treaty still had domestic effect even though other 
party to treaty, Italy, had unilaterally abrogated). The secondary by-product agreement 
has the force of federal law under the Supremacy Clause. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 
(1957). It is not, however, procedurally a constitutional treaty; the only authority necessary 
for the secondary agreement's completion is the primary agreement. Id. at 529. 
39 Under a Presidential Executive Agreement, sometimes known as an "inherent" or a 
"sole" Executive Agreement, the President enters into an agreement with a foreign power 
and binds the United States without any official senatorial or congressional approval. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 303, cmt. g. Theoretically, the President may do this 
under his authority as chief executive, head of state, or commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937); cf RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 8, at § 303(4). Based on this premise, however, the President may not bind the nation 
to any obligation that requires congressional approval. See, e.g., Valentine v. United States 
ex rei. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 
(4th Cir. 1953), afl'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). Presidential Executive Agree-
ments typically involve the disposition of armed forces in foreign lands and the recognition 
of governments. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 303, cmt. (8). 
40 A Previous Congressional Executive Agreement is a compact negotiated by the 
executive with prior congressional consent. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at 
§ 303(2). Both houses, not just the Senate, must pass resolutions authorizing these ne-
gotiations. Congress usually will spell out conditions upon which consent is given, thereby 
setting out parameters and boundaries for the executive's negotiating team. Cf HENKIN, 
supra note 33, at 173-76. 
41 Under a Subsequent Congressional Executive Agreement, Congress approves the 
negotiated final product without first granting consent to negotiators. Cf HENKIN, supra 
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Executive Agreements. These five procedures comprise the meth-
ods by which the federal government concludes agreements with 
other nations. 
GATS, if ultimately realized, would constitute a Subsequent 
Congressional Executive Agreement. In 1988, Congress passed, 
and the President signed into law, the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act (1988 Trade Act), to "enhance the competitive-
ness of American industry .... "42 Section 1l02(a) of this act gives 
the President the authority to enter into international trade agree-
ments before June 1, 1993, to help reduce tariff barriers.43 This 
authority bears directly on the Uruguay Round negotiations. Sec-
tion 1l02(b) of the 1988 Trade Act also gives the President au-
thority to negotiate and enter into international trade agreements 
before June 1, 1993 to reduce non-tariff barriers.44 This arguably 
grants authority to the President to negotiate and conclude an 
agreement on trade in services. 
Section 1103 of the 1988 Trade Act sets out the procedures 
for congressional implementation of any agreements entered into 
by the President under section 1l02(b).45 While Section 1l02(b) 
allows the President to bind the nation to a trade agreement 
under international law, the agreement will have no domestic 
legal effect until consented to or implemented by Congress.46 
The grant of such limited Presidential authority appears to be 
deliberate. One Senator has referred to "the negotiating authority 
... in the Uraguay [sic] round" that this law gives, rather than 
the treaty-making power it might have conveyed.47 A Congress-
man has pointed out that sections 1102 and 1103 of the 1988 
Trade Act give the President "ample authority" to negotiate away 
note 33, at 173-76. Vnlike a Previous Congressional Executive Agreement, this procedure 
sets no initial parameters nor does it authorize the negotiations. 
42 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107, pmbl. (partially codified at 19 V.S.C.A. § 2901 (West Supp. 1990». 
43 19 V.S.C.A. § 2902(a) (West Supp. 1990). 
44 19 V.S.C.A. § 2902(b) (West Supp. 1990). 
45 19 V.S.C.A. § 2903 (West Supp. 1990). 
46 The international agreement may become a binding international obligation by 
presidential action alone. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 
1969, art. 7, §§ l(b), 2(a), arts. 12,27,8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); IAN R. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAw OF TREATIES 29-33 (2d ed. 1984). Although the Vnited States 
is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention, the State Department has observed that the 
convention "is already recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and 
practice." S. EXEC. Doc. No.1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). 
47 134 CONGo REc. SIO,696-702 (daily ed. Aug. 3,1988) (statement of Sen. Murkowski). 
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trade barriers,48 but do not give the President unchecked power 
to conclude accords dismantling such barriers.49 
III. THE SCOPE OF GATS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S 
POWER TO PREEMPT 
Although GATT provides a historic basis for GATS, and the 
1988 Trade Act provides both the authority to negotiate the 
agreement and the procedure for giving it domestic effect, the 
agreement may still be subject to constitutional challenges. For 
while comporting with established constitutional or legislative pro-
cedure, an agreement may nevertheless reach beyond the subject 
matter relegated to the federal government. 50 Generally, GATS 
will not. Through the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion,51 the federal government possesses ample authority to reg-
ulate the domestic service sectors that are the subject of GATS. 
Furthermore, the Constitution does not speak directly to the 
states' power to intercede and regulate international trade. One 
potential limitation on the federal government in this area, the 
Tenth Amendment, while purportedly broad in its sweep, does 
not permit the states to undo preexisting federal regulation in 
place through the Commerce Clause. Thus, the states are rela-
tively unprotected from the federal government's power to reg-
ulate international trade. 
A. The Commerce Clause and its Reach into Proposed Subject 
Services 
The chief constitutional source of authority to enforce GATS 
domestically is the Commerce Clause.52 The Commerce Clause is 
the vehicle that Congress used to shape domestic commercial 
policy in the 1930s and domestic social policy in the 1960s. It has 
also enabled Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
48 134 CONGo REC. H5522 (daily ed. July 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Gibbons). 
49 See 134 CONGo REC. SIO,717 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988) (statement of Sen. Durenberger); 
19 V.S.C.A. § 2901(a)(5) (West Supp. 1990) ("The Congress finds that-the President 
should be authorized and encouraged to negotiate . .. services agreements that meet the 
standards set forth in this title .... ") (emphasis added). 
50 See V.S. CONST. amends. IX, X. 
51 [d. at art. I, § 8, c1. 3. 
52 Some scholars and jurists differentiate between the Interstate Commerce Clause, the 
Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause. In this Article, the term 
"Commerce Clause" will refer to the Commerce Clause as a whole. 
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often the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress may structure tariff laws, as it has done 
through GATT and numerous bilateral tariff agreements world-
wide. Despite the existence of such congressional powers by virtue 
of the Commerce Clause, there are limits. The Clause does not 
deny more to the states than it grants to Congress. 53 Thus, what 
is not within the federal government's reach may be subject to 
state regulation.54 Indeed, one commentator has stated that "not 
all that Congress could reach today ... is forever foreclosed to 
state regulation when Congress is silent" on the subject.55 
In interpreting the extent of Congress's reach early on, courts 
distinguished between national and local concerns. 56 This analysis 
proved difficult, however, because few subjects are wholly na-
tional or wholly local. Later, Chief Justice Stone altered the early 
distinction by stating that "reconciliation of the conflicting claims 
of state and national power ... [by] appraisal and accommodation 
of the competing demands of the state and national interests 
involved ... " is the correct method by which to interpret the 
Commerce Clause and its reach.57 
Today, Justice Stone's view seems to coincide with judicial tests 
used in evaluating states' attempts to regulate foreign trade. 
These tests ask whether the state regulation places an "unreason-
able" or "undue" burden on such trade. 58 Additional judicial 
limitations applicable to interstate regulation of trade also apply 
when states attempt to regulate foreign trade. Justice Bradley 
described these limitations when he wrote: "[A] State can no more 
regulate or impede commerce among the several States than it 
can regulate or impede commerce with foreign nations."59 This 
statement implied that states had even less power to regulate 
international trade than interstate trade. Thus, in the foregoing 
fashion, courts limited the powers of the states to regulate inter-
national trade. 
While courts limited states' power to regulate international 
trade, the power of the federal government in this field became 
53 HENKIN, supra note 33, at 235. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852). 
57 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945). 
58 See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917); Southern Ry. Co. 
v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910). 
59 Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 632 (1885). 
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broad. As the Supreme Court declared, "[w]hatever ... Congress 
determines, either as to regulation [of commerce] or the liability 
for its infringement, [it] is exclusive of state authority."60 In other 
words, whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause power, 
all conflicting state laws must give way.61 Congress, however, de-
termines the extent of its regulation. Its exercise of Commerce 
Clause power might be whole or inchoate as it "may so circum-
scribe its regulation as to leave a part of the subject open to state 
action. "62 Moreover, Congress can delegate its power to admin-
istrative and other agencies, and presumably to international or-
ganizations. Such delegation, without more, precludes state action 
altogether,63 although the extent of delegation depends on 
congressional intent.64 The limits of congressional power have 
not yet been drawn, but the powers of the federal government 
under the Commerce Clause appear almost absolute. State reg-
ulations are limited to areas which are reasonable, of local nature, 
and not expressly or impliedly preempted by Congress. 
Thus, in order for GATS to withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge, the targeted service sectors must be subject to federal 
regulation or preemption through the Commerce Clause. There 
are many theoretical and practical service sectors that GATS may 
target. Among the most likely are insurance, banking, securities 
trading and related services, shipping and transport, telecom-
munications, tourism, education, and professional services.65 
Consideration of whether these service sectors may be regulated 
by GATS through the federal government's Commerce Clause 
power follows. 
1. Insurance 
A striking example of an area where GATS would preempt 
local law is the insurance sector. For much of this nation's history, 
U.S. courts viewed the insurance industry as a local concern, as 
60 Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 104 (1876). 
61 See Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148, 149 (1868). 
62 Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 57,60 (1934). 
63 See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 773-76 
(1947). 
64 Id.; see also Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1,8 (1957). 
65 See KROMMENACKER, supra note 21, at 5. 
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it was affected with the public interest66 and was quasi-public in 
character.67 Because of the insurance industry's local nature, the 
states, under their police powers, had the authority to prescribe 
terms and conditions upon which insurance companies could 
conduct business.68 
In 1944, however, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Ass'n,69 the Supreme Court effectively reversed precedent1° and 
declared that the insurance industry fit squarely within the scope 
of the Commerce Clause. Thus, the insurance industry was no 
longer subject to regulation exclusively by the states. 71 In re-
sponse, Congress, exercising its Commerce Clause power, passed 
the McCarren-Ferguson Act.72 The McCarren-Ferguson Act re-
turned the bulk of insurance industry regulation to the states by 
delegating to them the congressional authority recognized in 
South-Eastern.73 Since 1944, U.S. courts have allowed the states to 
regulate the insurance sector under this delegation.74 
Congress, however, has begun to take back some of what it had 
given to the states. The McCarren-Ferguson Act itself does not 
grant to the states complete control of the insurance industry. 
For example, the insurance industry is still subject to federal anti-
trust laws.?5 Additionally, the Employee Retirement Insurance 
Security Act16 has partially preempted inconsistent state employee 
insurance laws. 77 Thus, because the insurance industry is no 
longer solely the province of state police powers, the federal 
government may constitutionally redistribute regulatory author-
ity, and may do so through GATS. 
66 See, e.g., German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389,407 (1914). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 322 U.S. 533, 545 (1944). 
70 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 WalL) 168, 183 (1868). The Court held that the business 
of insurance should be considered interstate commerce for the purpose of avoiding a 
narrowing of the Commerce Clause. In Paul, the Court upheld a state law while in United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, the Court struck down an act of Congress. 
71 322 U.S. at 546-53. 
72 Pub. L. No. 15,59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988». 
73 See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1979). 
74 See, e.g., id. at 218 n.18; Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Lowe v. Aarco-Am, Inc., 536 F.2d 1160, 1161 (7th Cir. 1976). 
75 See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 218 n.18. 
76 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). 
77 Howard v. Parisian, Inc., 807 F.2d 1560, 1563 (lIth Cir. 1987); Hewlett-Packard Co. 
v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978). 
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2. Banking 
The banking services sector would also be subject to GATS 
preemption. Like the insurance industry, courts have character-
ized banks and banking as quasi-public institutions and prac-
tices.78 They are seen as creatures of the state affected with the 
public interest.79 Again, stemming from this characterization, 
courts have held that banking is a proper subject of state regu-
lation.80 
Banks, however, may also be creatures of foreign or federal 
governments.81 State banks are naturally subject to their own 
state's laws. Surprisingly, national and international banks are 
also subject to state laws, so long as the state laws do not impinge 
upon or frustrate federal policy.82 
The power of the federal government to incorporate banks has 
been implied from article I, section 8 of the Constitution, as there 
is no express constitutional grant.83 Interstate banking has also 
been held subject to regulation by Congress through the Com-
merce Clause.84 It is therefore logical and consistent for the fed-
eral government to regulate international banking habits legis-
lated by the states.85 Thus, because the federal government may 
constitutionally regulate interstate banking, it may also regulate 
such banking activities through GATS. 
3. Securities 
Securities trading and related services also fall within the scope 
of the federal government's Commerce Clause power, and, there-
fore, may be preempted by GATS. Prior to the Great Depression 
78 McKee & Co. v. First Nat. Bank of San Diego, 265 F. Supp. 1,9 (S.D. Cal. 1967), 
aft'd, 397 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1968); Floyd v. Thornton, 68 S.E.2d 334, 336 (S.C. 1951). 
79 See In re Thornton, 7 F. Supp. 613, 614 (D. Colo. 1934). 
80 New Hampshire Bankers Ass'n v. Nelson, 336 F. Supp. 1330, 1336 (D.N.H.), a/I'd, 
460 F.2d 307 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972); see Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 
219 U.S. 104, 187-89 (1911). 
81 See Branch v. United States, 12 Ct. CI. 281, 286 (1876), a/I'd, 100 U.S. 673 (1879). 
82 See genemUy Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); 
Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U.S. 216, 219 (1935). 
8g First Nat. Bank of Bay City v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416, 418-
19 (1917). 
84 See NLRB v. Northern Trust Co., 56 F. Supp. 335, 338 (N.D. Ill. 1944), a/I'd, 148 
F.2d 24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 731 (1945). 
85 Note that there are anomalous restrictions placed upon international banking con-
cerns wishing to operate in Arizona, Colorado, and Virginia. Hawley Interview, supra note 
7. 
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of the 1930s, individual states had free reign to regulate securi-
ties.86 The Great Depression, however, eroded confidence in the 
U.S. investment community, and the federal government stepped 
in and enacted the Securities Act of 193387 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.88 By enacting this legislation, Congress 
entered the field of interstate securities and effectively preempted 
any inconsistent state law.89 Thereafter, securities were defined 
as subjects of interstate commerce and were thus subject to fed-
eral regulation.90 
Certain aspects of securities law are still governed by state law. 
Through "blue-sky" laws, states regulate and control traffic in 
securities wholly within their own borders and protect ordinary 
citizens from the kinds of fraud and deception not covered by 
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.91 Blue-sky laws have been upheld as a 
proper exercise of the state police power, and are thus constitu-
tiona1.92 GATS will legitimately encompass interstate sales of se-
curities, because such sales are within the regulatory power of 
the federal government. Individual state blue-sky laws, however, 
may indeed survive federal attempts at preemption, because they 
regulate only intrastate sales.93 
4. Transportation 
The federal government may also preempt state regulation of 
the shipping and transport sectors through GATS. Since the 
seminal case of Gibbons v. Ogden, water transport between states 
has been subject to federal regulation through the Commerce 
Clause.94 Over the years, federal regulation of shipping has 
greatly increased. Courts have held that the federal government 
86 See generally Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls 
Stockyards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917). Use of the term "security" refers to stocks, bonds, 
and other indicia of ownership. 
87 Pub. L. 22,48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1988». 
88 Pub. L. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988». 
89 See Bogy v. United States, 96 F.2d 734, 737 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 608 
(1938). 
90 Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888, 890-91 (10th Cir. 1939). 
91 Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 & n.16 (1982); Travelers Health Ass'n v. 
Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 644 (1950). 
92 See, e.g., Edgar, 457 U.S. at 641; Underhill Associates v. Bradshaw, 674 F.2d 293 (4th 
Cir. 1982). 
9. See People v. Eiseman, 248 P. 716, 727 (1926), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 663 (1927); 
see also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1917). 
94 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
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has the authority, through the Commerce Clause, to regulate 
lighthouses,95 lights upon vessels,96 port safety,97 tugs,98 pilotage,99 
and admiralty salvage. lOo The navigable waters of the United 
States are "deemed public property of the nation, and subject to 
all requisite legislation of Congress."IOI Thus, the federal govern-
ment effectively controls the field of maritime transport, which 
is appropriately subject to regulation under GATS. 
Congress has also heavily regulated air transport and freight. 
Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,102 Congress granted the 
Federal Aviation Administration exclusive responsibility for the 
safe and efficient management of the nation's airspace. 103 Local 
and state governments are "vested only with the power to pro-
mulgate reasonable, non-arbitrary and non-disciplinary regula-
tions."104 The federal government's power to regulate air space 
is as far reaching as its power to regulate navigable waters. 105 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine how the federal government could 
not bring U.S. air transport laws under the control of GATS. 
The broad ground transport sector does not fit as easily under 
Congress's Commerce Clause powers. While railroads have long 
been under federal, rather than state regulatory control, courts 
have left regulation of automobiles to state control. In general, 
when a railroad voluntarily operates as a common carrier in 
interstate commerce, it is subject to federal regulation. 106 More-
over, courts have also held that Congress may regulate purely 
intrastate phases of railroad businesses if necessary to properly 
regulate interstate commerce. 107 
95 See, e.g., Fruin Colnon Corp. v. Vogt, 500 F. Supp. 606 (S.D. III. 1980). 
96 See, e.g., The Hazel Kirke, 25 F. 601 (C.C.N.Y. 1885). 
97 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Parcels of Land Situated in City of Valdez, 666 
F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1982). 
98 See, e.g., Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937). 
99 See, e.g., Davis v. MIV Ester S, 509 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1975). 
100 See, e.g., Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 2103 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990). 
101 Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 725 (1866). 
10. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1982 & Supp. 1987). 
103 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 626, 639-40 (1973); 
United States v. County of Westchester, 571 F. Supp. 786,797 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
104 British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 558 F.2d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 1977); see 
also Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 978 (1975) (there is a "prevailing federal interest in uniform air law regulation"). 
105 United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1979). 
106 ICC v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry., 167 U.S. 633, 642 (1897). 
107 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III, 121 (1942); see also Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n 
No. 40, 84 F.2d 641, 650 (4th Cir. 1936), afl'd, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). 
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With respect to automobiles, states may regulate, free from 
federal interference, the use and operation of motor vehicles on 
the public highways of the state lO8 by residents and nonresidents 
alike. 109 States have broad powers to protect their citizens' physical 
and business safety, even by use of measures that adversely affect 
interstate commerce. 110 Courts view interstate carriage as com-
merce, and thus subject to regulation under the Commerce 
Clause. lll Intrastate carriage, however, is viewed as beyond the 
scope of the Commerce Clause. 112 Therefore, while all railroad 
activity may be within the scope of GATS, the states might retain 
some control over intrastate motor transport. 
5. Telecommunications 
The telecommunications sector encompasses many subsectors, 
including radio, television and cable broadcasting, telephones and 
telegraphs, and motion pictures. As these services often cross 
state lines, they have long been subject to federal regulation. In 
1934, Congress passed the Communications Act to aid in the 
streamlining of "interstate and foreign commerce in wire and 
radio communications."113 Through the Communications Act and 
other statutes, 114 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has acted as this nation's chief telecommunications watchdog. 115 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the power of Con-
gress and the FCC to regulate the telecommunications industry 
is constitutional. In Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, for 
example, the Supreme Court stated that the FCC, through the 
Communications Act, had the authority to preempt inconsistent 
state law under the Commerce Clause. 116 Furthermore, the Court 
has held that where state law "squarely conflicts with the accom-
108 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959). 
109 See Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610,624 (1915). 
110 H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (state regulation of 
milk transport). 
III Transamerica Freight Lines v. United States, 51 F. Supp. 405, 409 (D. Del. 1943); 
Eastern Carrier Corp. v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 232, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1939). 
112 Cf Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524 (if intrastate carriage unduly burdens interstate commerce, 
however, Congress may regulate it). 
113 Pub. L. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982 & 
Supp. 1987)). 
114 E.g., Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). 
115 Richard McKenna, Preemption Under the Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 
12-18 (1985). 
116 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986). 
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plishment and execution of the full purposes of federal law" in 
the telecommunications field, the state statute must yield. ll7 In 
light of the predominant federal role in telecommunications, 
GATS will completely preempt inconsistent state regulation of 
that sector. 
6. Tourism 
The tourism service sector may also be subject to GATS 
preemption, although there is little precedent upon which to base 
such a prediction. A great majority of the tourism trade is han-
dled at the local level, and therefore, the states regulate the 
balance of tourism. I IS Still, the federal government has stepped 
into the field, albeit tentatively. In 1961, Congress created the 
United States Travel and Tourism Administration1l9 and the 
Tourism Policy Counci}l20 to "assure that the national interest in 
tourism is fully considered in federal decision-making."121 The 
Tourism Administration's primary purpose is limited-to inform 
and advertise rather than to set policy. The resulting lack of 
judicial, legislative, or administrative attention to the tourism in-
dustry makes the propriety of a GATS link to the tourism sector 
difficult to gauge. GATS, however, would necessarily affect for-
eign nationals visiting this country and vice versa. Therefore, it 
is logical that GATS could preempt inconsistent state laws in this 
area. 
7. Education 
Education has historically been the domain of the states,122 and 
thus, unless educational activities cross states lines, GATS would 
not preempt state regulation of education. As the Supreme Court 
has stated, "[n]o single tradition in public education is more 
117 Capital Cities Cable, v. Crisp, 467 V.S. 691, 716 (1984). 
118 Morris v. Hotel Riviera, 704 F.2d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Ramsay Travel, 
v. Kondo, 495 P.2d 1172 (Haw. 1972), appeal dismissed, 410 V.S. 949 (1973). Compare 
Grand Canyon Dories, v. Idaho Outfitters & Guides Bd., 709 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1983) 
with Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 V.S.C.A. §§ 2101, 2103 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990). 
119 Pub. L. No. 87-63, 75 Stat. 130 (1961) (codified as amended at 22 V.S.C. § 2124 
(1988». 
120 Pub. L. No. 97-63,95 Stat. 1015 (1981) (codified as amended at 22 V.S.C. § 2 I 24a(a) 
(1988». 
121 22 V.S.C. § 2124a(a) (1988). 
122 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 V.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public education 
in OUT Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities."). 
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deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools." 123 
This deeply rooted tradition of local control fades, however, when 
states attempt to regulate interstate and foreign educational ser-
vices. One court has held foreign correspondence schools to be 
engaged in foreign commerce and, therefore, subject to Federal 
Trade Commission regulation. 124 The Supreme Court has held 
the business of interstate correspondence education to be com-
merce and not amenable to state control. 125 Furthermore, states 
have been precluded from taxing those portions of for-profit 
schools' receipts that come from interstate trade. 126 Based on 
these experiences, it is fair to conclude that GATS covers only 
those educational functions extending beyond state boundaries, 
a conclusion entirely consistent with the purpose of GATS.127 
8. Professional Services 
State governments have traditionally regulated professional 
services. Regulation of the legal profession, for instance, has long 
been the province of the states. As one court has stated, "[s]tate 
courts . . . possess exclusive authority to regulate admission to 
their respective state bars .... "128 When a state has excluded a 
nonresident from the bar, legal and constitutional questions have 
been raised. Courts, however, have analyzed most of these ques-
tions under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 129 not the Com-
merce Clause. 13o Because constitutional questions concermng 
12' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974). 
124 Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 34 (7th Cir. 1944); see also Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1988). 
125 See International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91,106-08 (1910). 
126 National Schools v. City of Los Angeles, 287 P.2d 151, 158 (Cal. 1955), cert. denied, 
350 U.S. 968 (1956). 
127 Cf Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1968) (state educational institution 
whose activities reached beyond state boundaries subject to Department of Labor regu-
lations). 
128 Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility, 717 F.2d 1424, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
cf S. Stern, Henry & Co. v. McDermott, 38 Mise. 2d 50, 58, 236 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 A.D.2d 864, 245 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1963) ("The Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution of the United States does not deprive [a state] of its power to protect 
its citizens from unethical legal practices."). 
129 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Barnend v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989); 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). 
130 Cf Nordgren v. Hafter, 616 F. Supp. 742, 753-57 (S.D. Miss. 1985), aff'd, 789 F.2d 
334 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986) (discussing Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses). Some inconsistencies, however, have been pointed out in connection 
with anti-trust laws. Cf Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (sug-
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GATS would be analyzed under the Commerce Clause, the ability 
of GATS to preempt state control in the legal profession would 
be limited. 
This limitation on the reach of GATS also applies to other 
professions. Accountants are licensed and regulated by state gov-
ernments, not the federal government. 131 The same is true for 
professional engineers,132 physicians,133 and architects. 134 GATS 
may reach these professions if the services they provide have 
interstate or foreign connections. Otherwise, the states will prob-
ably retain their control over these professional services. 
B. The Tenth Amendment and its Protections 
While courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause to grant 
the federal government broad regulatory powers, the Tenth 
Amendment's reservation of powers to the states may stand as 
another constitutional obstacle to GATS preemption of state law. 
The Supreme Court has read the Tenth Amendment to limit the 
federal reach through the Commerce Clause. Absent congres-
sional entry into a field recognized under the Commerce Clause, 
the powers of the states to prescribe regulations within their 
borders are reserved by the Tenth Amendment. 135 
If a state, however, attempts to regulate an area already subject 
to congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause, the 
Tenth Amendment will not permit a state to usurp the prior 
federal action. 136 Additionally, the Tenth Amendment does not 
limit congressional power to preempt or displace state regulation 
of private activities affecting interstate and foreign commerce. 137 
Furthermore, the Constitution entrusts matters pertaining to in-
ternational relations solely to the federal government, and the 
gesting, however, that if a state court regulates professional services in a manner that 
results in anti-trust violations, then no anti-trust liability would attach). 
131 Mercer v. Hemmings, 170 So. 2d 33, 39 (Fla. 1964). 
132 State ex rel. Wisconsin Registration Bd. of Architects and Professional Engineers v. 
T.V. Engineers of Kenosha, 141 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Wis. 1966). 
133 Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935); People 
v. Jeffers, 690 P.2d 194, 198 (Colo. 1984). 
134 Paterson v. University of State of New York, 201 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1964); cf 
Marcus & Nocka v. Julian Goodrich Architects, 250 A.2d 739 (Vt. 1969) (nonresident). 
135 Commonwealth v. Perkins, 21 A.2d 45, 49-51 (Pa. 1941), a/I'd, 314 U.S. 586 (1942). 
136 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 376 (1946). 
137 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 283-
93 (1981). 
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Tenth Amendment does not change this.138 Indeed, courts have 
held the Tenth Amendment to be too vague and amorphous to 
limit federal authority over international commerce. Thus, the 
Tenth Amendment is unlikely to affect significantly preemption 
of inconsistent state law by GATS. 
IV. AN EXPLORATION INTO JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF AGREEMENTS 
SIMILAR TO GATS 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that U.S. courts have con-
sidered, and approved, broad federal powers to preempt state 
law through the Commerce Clause. 139 This suggests that a chal-
lenge to GATS as beyond the scope of the federal government's 
regulatory power would fail. United States courts have also con-
sidered the scope of the federal government's treaty power. The 
reasoning of those decisions suggests that GATS will withstand 
challenges based on the grounds that it exceeds the federal gov-
ernment's treaty making power. 
Federal courts have a history of upholding commercial treaties 
and agreements as the supreme law of the land, thereby preempt-
ing state laws. In early decisions, courts routinely upheld treaties 
in the face of constitutional attacks from anti-federalists and state 
governments. State courts have also shown great reluctance to 
uphold state law that seems to conflict with federal treaties. In-
deed, both federal and state courts have upheld most commercial 
agreements, including the agreements comprising the Bretton 
Woods System. GATT in particular has been upheld, if only 
sheepishly, and in the face of congressional opposition. 
138 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). Similarly, the Ninth Amendment does 
not aid the states in limiting the Foreign Commerce Clause reach of Congress. The Ninth 
Amendment was drafted to cope with the problems created by the enumeration of specific 
rights in the first eight amendments. The framers feared that certain rights may have 
been omitted, and were concerned that vagaries of language might adversely affect other 
rights intended to be preserved. Schertz v. Waupaca County, 683 F. Supp. 1551, 1561 
(E.D. Wis. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Amendment standing 
alone, however, does not contain constitutional guarantees of freedom or limit the power 
of the federal government. Metz v. McKinley, 583 F. Supp. 683, 688 n.4 (S.D. Ga.), aff'd, 
747 F.2d 709 (lIth Cir. 1984). The Ninth Amendment prevents the federal government 
from degrading or rejecting any rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 
Schertz, 683 F. Supp. at 1561. These rights are personal rights between the federal 
government and the individual, and do not involve the states either alone or through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-53 (1833). 
139 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 20; HENKIN, supra note 33. 
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A. The Bretton Woods Agreement 
The Supreme Court has explicitly upheld the Bretton Woods 
Agreement. In Kolovrat v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that 
the Bretton Woods Agreement preempted an Oregon testamen-
tary law. 140 In this case, two Oregon residents had died intestate, 
leaving as their statutory heirs siblings and cousins in Yugoslavia. 
As aliens, however, the Yugoslav next of kin could not take real 
or personal property by succession under Oregon law. 141 There-
fore, the property escheated to the state. 142 The Oregon Supreme 
Court held that the Yugoslav heirs had failed to show that there 
existed "as a matter of law an unqualified and enforceable right 
to receive" the property under the Oregon statute. 143 The court, 
therefore, allowed the property to pass to the state. 144 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Among other treaties cited, 
the Court noted that the Bretton Woods Agreement, to which 
both the United States and Yugoslavia were signatories, applied 
to the Kolovrat case. The Court found that the federal govern-
ment had validly adopted the Bretton Woods Agreement and 
that it bore directly on the commercial property rights being 
litigated. In particular, the Court broadly read article IV, section 
3 of the agreement as "forbid[ding] any participating country 
from exercising controls over international capital movements 'in 
a manner which will . . . unduly delay transfers of funds in 
settlement of commitments .... "'145 The Oregon law arguably 
"delayed transfers of funds," and therefore the Court held that 
it must yield to the federal treaty.146 
B. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly approved GATT itself. 
In fact, only timid, fleeting references to GATT have appeared 
140 366 U.S. 187, 198 (1961). 
141 OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1951), repealed by 1969 Or. Laws c. 591, § 305. 
142 OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070(3) (1951), repealed by 1969 Or. Laws c. 591, § 305. 
143 In re Stoich's Estate, 349 P.2d 255, 262 (Or. 1960). 
144 Id. at 268. 
145 Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 197 (1961). 
146 Id. at 197-98 ("Oregon of course cannot refuse to give foreign nationals their treaty 
rights because of fear that valid international agreements might possibly not work com-
pletely to the satisfaction of state authorities."). See also Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 13-
17 (1982) (preemptive effects of Bretton Woods Agreement invalidated state university'S 
denial of in-state status to domiciled non-immigrant alien employees of World Bank and 
IMF). 
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in Supreme Court rulings. 147 On the other hand, several state 
courts have ruled upon and upheld GATT as a legitimate con-
stitutional agreement preempting inconsistent state law. 
The leading state case validating GATT is Territory v. HO.148 In 
Ho, the defendant, a vendor, allegedly offered to sell imported 
Australian eggs without posting a sign clearly identifying himself 
as a seller of non-domestic eggs, as required by a Hawaii statute. 149 
Hawaii then filed an information against the vendor for non-
compliance. A Hawaii state court ruled in the vendor's favor, 
citing violations of due process, unconstitutional delegations of 
power, and direct contravention of GA TT.150 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed the result, but only on 
the grounds that GATT preempted the local law. 151 The court 
acknowledged that the constitutionality of GATT had been "re-
peatedly questioned in and out of Congress."152 The court, how-
ever, reasoned that under certain U.S. Supreme Court 
precedents153 and the Supremacy Clause, an "executive agree-
ment, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" was 
a treaty within the meaning of the Constitution and was, therefore 
valid. 154 Thus, because GATT required national treatment in 
internationally traded goods, as the supreme law of the land, it 
preempted the Hawaii statute. 155 
The New Jersey Supreme Court has also ruled upon the valid-
ity of GATT. In K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. 
Water Supply Comm'n, the plaintiff manufacturer brought suit 
challenging the validity of New Jersey's "Buy American Act" in 
conjunction with a water treatment plant. 156 The plaintiff argued 
147 See, e.g., Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 439 n.4 (1979); cf 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457 (1978). 
148 41 Haw. 565 (1957). 
149 [d. at 566. Here, the court refers to Revised Laws of Hawaii § 1308.02 (1945), as 
amended by 1955 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 167, § 5 (1955). 
150 41 Haw. at 566-67. 
151 [d. at 567. 
152 [d. Here, the court refers to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of June 21, 1955, 
ch. 169, § 2, 69 Stat. 162 (1955). The Act states that it "shall not be construed to determine 
or indicate the approval or disapproval by the Congress of the executive agreement 
known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." [d. at 163. 
153 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937). 
154 41 Haw. at 568-69. 
155 /d.; see JACKSON, supra note 18, at III & n.11, 287-88 (discussing State Department's 
reaction to Ho decision). 
156 381 A.2d 774 (N.]. 1977). The New Jersey Buy American Act, like its California 
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that the New Jersey act was inoperative because it was inconsistent 
with GATT. The trial court ruled the New Jersey act invalid,157 
and the Appellate Division affirmed. 158 
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts' 
analyses, calling GATT "a multilateral international agreement 
to which the United States is a party .... "159 The court also 
recognized the presidential authority to bind the United States 
to GATT, 160 and considered GATT the legal equivalent of a 
treaty.161 Thus, the court concluded that GATT was "by virtue 
of the federal constitution, 'the supreme law of the land'" and 
that "[a] state law must yield when it is inconsistent with or impairs 
the policy or provisions of a treaty."162 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, however, found that GATT did not apply to the specific 
facts at hand. 163 Thus, while it ultimately reversed the case, it did 
so on the facts, not the presumptions of law. 164 
C. The Warsaw Convention 
United States courts have held that the Warsaw Convention on 
air transport,165 while narrower in scope than the Bretton Woods 
Agreement and GATT, also preempts state laws. The Warsaw 
Convention squarely touches upon commerce and upon air trans-
port, subjects that GATS will likely cover. In Floyd v. Eastern 
predecessor, mandated that all state government entities attempt to procure their goods 
and services from U.S. companies and suppliers before turning to often cheaper foreign 
competitors. 
157 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 376 A.2d 
203 (N.J. 1977). 
158 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 376 A.2d 
960 (N.J. 1977). 
159 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 
at 777. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. at 778. 
162 [d. (footnote and citations omitted). 
163 [d. at 782. The court found that government purification and not-for-profit distri-
bution of water were not commercial acts within the scope of GATT. 
164 See also Armstrong v. Taxation Div. Director, 5 N.J. Tax 117 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983), 
a/I'd, 6 N.J. Tax 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); cf Stinson Canning Co. v. Mos-
bacher, 731 F. Supp. 32 (D. Me. 1990) (GATT claim dropped before trial on merits); 
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court in and for San Francisco, 208 Cal. App. 
2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1962) (city ordinance held inconsistent and void in face of 
GATT provision even when certain GATT provisions were incorporated into ordinance). 
See generally Jackson, supra note 20. 
165 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929,49 Stat. 3000. 
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Airlines, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that 
the Warsaw Convention preempted inconsistent local laws. 166 In 
Floyd, passengers on an Eastern Airlines flight from Miami to the 
Bahamas sued the airline to recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 167 The passengers based their claim upon Flor-
ida common law and upon the Warsaw Convention, which had 
previously been held to create such a cause of action. 168 The 
Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that the Warsaw Convention, as 
a valid U.S. treaty on point, preempted all inconsistent state 
laws. 169 Rather than collecting an arguably unlimited damage 
award under Florida law, the plaintiffs were limited to the 
$75,000 maximum in compensatory damages permitted under 
the Warsaw Convention. 170 
In Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American Worid 
Airways, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
Warsaw Convention preempted a cause of action under state 
law. l7l The plaintiff shipper sued the defendant air carrier for 
damaged cargo. In brushing aside the plaintiff's state law claims, 
the court declared that because the Warsaw Convention is a fed-
eral treaty under the constitution, it "creates the cause of action 
and is the exclusive remedy." 172 The court also noted that because 
the purpose of most multilateral treaties is to "secure uniformity," 
any enforcement of inconsistent state law would necessarily un-
dermine uniformity.173 Therefore, the state laws in question were 
preempted. 174 
166 872 F.2d 1462, 1480-81 (lIth Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, III S. Ct. 1489 
(1991). 
167 Id. at 1466. A loss of power during the flight caused the emotional injury. 
168 Id.; see also Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916-19 (2d Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. Ill4 (1979); cf Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392,405 (1985). 
But see Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, III S. Ct. 1489, 1502 (1991). See generally Glen Pogust, 
The Warsaw Convention-Does it Create a Cause of Action?, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 366 (1978). 
169 872 F.2d at 1470. 
170 Id. at 1485. 
171 737 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985). 
172 Id. at 458. 
mId. at 459; see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 
(1963). 
174 See also Highlands Ins. Co. v. Trinidad and Tobago Airways, 739 F.2d 536, 537 (3d 
Cir. 1984); Rhymes v. Arrow Air, 636 F. Supp. 737, 741 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Perkin Elmer 
v. Trans Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L., 107 F.R.D. 55, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Korean 
Air Lines Disaster of Sept. I, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1468 (D.D.C. 1985); Warsaw v. 
Trans World Airlines, 442 F. Supp. 400, 408 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Husser! v. Swiss Air 
Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Burnett v. Trans Wor!d 
Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (D.N.M. 1973); Newsome v. Trans Int'l Airlines, 492 
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D. Certain Bilateral and Multilateral Trade and Specific Issue 
Agreements 
United States courts have also found that certain bilateral trade 
agreements preempt state and local laws. One case involved a 
commercial and navigational treaty between the United States 
and Japan. 175 In Asakura v. City of Seattle, a Japanese national 
living in Seattle was denied a license to operate a pawnshop within 
the city limits. 176 A city ordinance made it unlawful for any person 
to operate a pawnshop without a license, and prohibited granting 
licenses to non-citizens. The Japanese national filed suit in state 
court, claiming that the local ordinance contradicted the treaty 
between the United States and Japan. The trial court held that 
the city ordinance did violate the treaty, and that the ordinance 
was unenforceable against Japanese citizens. 
The Supreme Court of Washington disagreed. 177 Its decision 
rested upon the language of the treaty itself, declaring that the 
treaty "guarantees only to the subject of Japan residing in the 
United States the right to 'carryon trade' upon the same terms 
as [U.S.] citizens."178 Viewing pawnbroking as a privilege, and not 
a right, the court held that the treaty did not preempt the local 
ordinance, stating that "[t]he treaty does not secure to an alien 
the right to exercise a privilege."179 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 180 The Court disregarded 
the Washington Supreme Court's facile distinctions between a 
"right to 'carryon trade'" and a "right to pawnbroke."181 The 
Court agreed that Seattle could, without running afoul of the 
treaty, prohibit pawnbroking, but it would have to do so abso-
lutely.182 The Court went on, however, to point out that the treaty 
spoke of national treatment for Japanese citizens, and the Seattle 
ordinance denied national treatment, thereby placing the trade 
SO. 2d 592, 599 (Ala.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Hepp v. United Airlines, 540 P.2d 
1141,1143 (Colo. 1975); Bianchi v. United Air Lines, 587 P.2d 632, 634 (Wash. 1978). 
175 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504. 
176 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30, 32 (Wash. 1922). 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 [d. 
180 Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. at 332. 
181 [d. at 342-43. 
182 [d. at 342 ("Such a law would apply equally to aliens and citizens, and no question 
of conflict with the treaty would arise."). 
1992J GATS AND STATE LAW PREEMPTION 101 
treaty unquestionably on point. Thus, the treaty preempted the 
local law and controlled as the supreme law of the land. 
Similar issues arose out of Puerto Rico's 1936 enactment of 
legislation which, among other things, prohibited the use of 
trademarks on distilled spirits manufactured in Puerto Rico if the 
trademarks were used outside the island. 183 The Bacardi Corpo-
ration sued the Treasurer of Puerto Rico to invalidate the statute 
on the grounds that the Pan American Trademark Convention 
preempted it. 184 The trial court held the legislation invalid. 18s 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that 
the convention did not expressly preempt future Puerto Rican 
legislation. '86 In turn, the Supreme Court reversed, essentially 
agreeing with the trial court. 
The Court held that the Convention's provisions did indeed 
preempt the Puerto Rican legislation. '87 The Court found that 
the Trademark Convention was explicitly clear, mandating that 
trademarks could be used on a national basis. 188 The Court held 
that because the treaty had been ratified and bore directly on the 
Puerto Rican legislation's subject matter, it preempted the Puerto 
Rican statute. 189 
E. Treaties on Property and Natural Resources 
United States courts have upheld certain other types of treaties 
and compacts concerning property and national resources as well. 
These decisions may also shed light onto how GATS might be 
judicially received. One decision involved the 1850 Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Aus-
tria, which gave Austrian nationals the right to inherit real prop-
erty, provided such property was sold within two years. 190 This 
treaty became the focus of Hughes v. Techt. 191 In Hughes, an Amer-
ican citizen died intestate, leaving as his heirs two daughters, one 
an American citizen, and one a national of Austria by marriage. 
183 1936 P.R. Laws 115, permanently reenacted by 1937 P.R. Laws 149. 
184 Pan-American Convention for the Protection of Trademarks, Feb. 20, 1929,46 Stat. 
2907. 
185 See Snacho v. Bacardi Corp. of America, 109 F.2d 57, 59 (lst Cir. 1940). 
186 Id. 
187 Barcardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940). 
188 I d. at 163-64. 
189 Id. at 162. 
190 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 25, 1850, U.S.-Aus., 9 Stat. 944. 
191 176 N.Y.S. 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919). 
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The American heir sought to deny her sister one-half of the 
estate due her on alternative grounds-New York common law, 
which denied devises of land to aliens, and spontaneous abroga-
tion of the treaty by World War I. The New York Supreme Court 
held that the Austrian national could take land as an heir at law 
under the treaty. The Appellate Division affirmed. 192 
The New York Court of Appeals agreed. 193 The court, per 
Justice Cardozo, stated that at common law, while aliens could 
take land by purchase, they could not take land by descent. 194 
The plaintiff, however, could take under the treaty, because it 
specifically provided lineal descent for Austrian nationals. 195 The 
court held the convention to have been effective and valid on the 
date of the American citizen's death, and thus, it automatically 
preempted state common law. 196 
A similar situation arose out of an 1899 treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain which provided that each of the 
signatories' nationals would be able to take real property as heirs 
or devisees. 197 In 1961, in In re Estate of Wilson, an English national 
devised real property in Nebraska to his widow. Upon her death 
in 1969, the property was to be split among their children, also 
English nationals. A Nebraska statute, however, prohibited non-
resident aliens from acquiring title to real estate by devise or 
descent. 198 The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the treaty 
controlled, not the state statute. 199 The court reasoned that the 
treaty was effective and on point, therefore the children could 
take the real property as heirs and not have their inheritance 
escheat to the state. 2DD The treaty thus preempted the inconsistent 
state law. 
192 Hughes v. Techt, 177 N.Y.S. 420 (1919). 
193 Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185 (N.Y. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920). 
194 !d. at 186. 
195 Id. at 191. 
196 Id. 
197 Convention, Mar. 2, 1899, U.S.-U.K., 31 Stat. 1939. 
198 In re Estate of Wilson, 237 N.W.2d 835, 836-37 (Neb. 1976). 
199 Id. at 837. 
200 Id.; see, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443-62 (1968) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); In re Lagunowicz, 520 P.2d 536 (Ariz. 1974); In re Ostrowski's Estate, 290 N.Y.S. 
174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936); In re Kasendorf's Estate, 353 P.2d 531 (Or. 1960); Clostermann 
v. Schmidt, 332 P.2d 1036 (Or. 1958); see also Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 
(1930); In re Klekunas' Estate, 205 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. 1965); Guiseppe v. Cozzani, 159 So. 
2d 278 (Miss. 1964); In re Carizzo's Estate, 211 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961); Gillette 
v. Luone Co., 114 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952); In re Johnston, 190 S.E.2d 879 
(N.C. 1972); Antosz v. State Compensation Comm'r, 43 S.E.2d 397 (W.Va. 1947); Engen 
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Finally, in the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland,201 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held a federal treaty was superior to, and thus 
preemptive of, inconsistent state law concerning wildlife. In Hol-
land, the treaty, between the United States and Great Britain, 
proclaimed that certain migratory birds native to Canada and the 
United States were not to be hunted, captured, killed, or sold.202 
A federal game warden sought to enforce the treaty against cer-
tain Missouri hunting and licensing laws that left the migratory 
birds in question unprotected. The Court concluded that because 
there was a valid treaty encompassing the subject matter upon 
which Missouri wished to legislate, any inconsistent state laws 
were necessarily preempted.203 The Court viewed the migratory 
birds as national resources and held that in order to protect 
national resources, "[i]t is not sufficient to rely upon the States."204 
F. Executive Compacts on Takings and Nationalizations 
United States courts have also held that presidential compacts 
touching upon banking and property rights are the supreme law 
of the land. Belmont v. United States,205 a case arising in the after-
math of the 1917 October Revolution, involved the new Soviet 
government's nationalization of the Petrograd Metal Works, 
among other businesses. The Soviet government assigned its bank 
accounts to the U.S. government through a compact with Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt.206 The U.S. government sought to 
recover the bank account. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that the United States could not recover the account, 
because the assignment was contrary to New York state policy.207 
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. In reversing, the 
Court declared that "no state policy can prevail against the inter-
v. Union State Bank of Harvard, 236 N.W. 741 (Neb. 1931), cert. denied sub nom. Todok 
v. Union State Bank of Harvard, 284 U.S. 655 (1931); In re Chaoussis's Estate, 247 P. 732 
(Wash. 1926). 
201 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
202 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-U.K., 39 
Stat. 1702. 
20' 252 U.S. at 435. 
204 Id. 
205 85 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd, United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
206 Exchange of letters between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Foreign 
Minister Litvinov, Nov. 16, 1933, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 11 Bevans 1248, 1933 For. ReI. (II) 805, 
State Dep't Pub. 528 (commonly known as thl': Litvinov Assignments). 
207 Belmont v. United States, 85 F.2d at 544. 
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national compact here involved."208 According to the Court, the 
compact was validly negotiated and entered into under the au-
thority of the Executive; it was explicitly clear, and therefore was 
binding upon the states.209 
United States courts have also found that many other types of 
international agreements preempt state laws. For example, the 
Eighth Circuit has held that state governments may not generate 
or perpetrate boundary disputes and their appurtenant obstruc-
tion of international trade. 2lO Furthermore, local governments 
and agencies may not overlook or ignore international legal pro-
cedures mandated by treaty. International process, for example, 
cannot be served except as provided for in the Hague Conven-
tion. 211 Finally, consuls and embassy administrators, in their rep-
resentative capacities, must be given standing in state probate 
courts pursuant to their respective treaties. 212 
In sum, the ability of state governments to affect rights, obli-
gations and conduct regulated or referred to by treaty, compact, 
or international agreement is severely limited. This limitation on 
the states bodes well for the domestic integrity of GATS. 
V. THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THE REALIZATION OF GATS 
Although there appear to be few constitutional obstacles to 
enactment of GATS, many political hurdles remain.213 While the 
208 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327. 
209 Id. at 330-32; cf United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). In Pink, the Court 
stated: "When the decision of ... local law is so interwoven with the decision of a question 
of national authority that the one necessarily involves the other, [the Court is] not fore-
closed by the state court's determination . . . . Otherwise national authority could be 
frustrated by local rulings." 315 U.S. at 238. 
210 See, e.g., Clark v. Pigeon River Improvement Slide & Boom Co., 52 F.2d 550, 556-
57 (8th Cir. 1931); cf Opinion of the Justices, 152 A.2d 173 (Me. 1959) (river pollution 
crossing boundary with Canada may be locally regulated). 
211 Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 
1965, 20 U.S.T. 361; see, e.g., Gordon v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 496 A.2d 132 (R.l. 1985); Ex 
parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983); cf Kadota v. Hos-
ogai, 608 P.2d 68 (Ariz. 1980) vacated, 700 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. 1985). The Kadota Court 
stated: "[T]he State of Arizona cannot attempt to exercise jurisdiction under a rule 
promulgated by its courts if that rule would violate an international treaty." 608 P.2d at 
73. 
212 See, e.g., In re Carizzo's Estate, 211 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (General 
Counsel of Italy held to have authority through treaty with United States to receive Italian 
national's payment of funds in face of contrary New York statute); In re Ostrowski's Estate, 
290 N.Y.S. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936) (French Counsel held to have treaty authority to take 
for infant heir at law). 
213 "[M]any wonder whether there are any limits other than those in congressional self 
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federal government may constitutionally relegate certain powers 
over commerce to a multilateral services agreement, it may en-
counter difficulty in convincing the states of the agreement's 
necessity. Congress and the executive branch may also have res-
ervations about preempting state regulation of activities long held 
to be of local concern. Governors and state legislators may feel 
an affront by yet another federal foray into their sovereign do-
mains. Furthermore, lobbies and special interest groups may feel 
that national or international uniformity may deprive them of 
certain privileges that they have come to enjoy and rely upon. 
These political factors may act to slow or derail GATS. 
A. At the Federal Level 
l. Congress 
Congress is particularly susceptible to political pressure when 
making decisions on trade policies. As one author has stated, 
"political leverage on Capitol Hill will ultimately decide how many 
[m]embers vote [for] the implementing legislation."214 Special in-
terests and lobbies have descended upon Washington to cajole 
legislators into viewing GATS in the most advantageous light.215 
Indeed, members have reacted to pressure from certain interests 
that would be adversely affected by GATS.216 Overall, however, 
congressional concern appears to be based on problems that 
would be created by the reversal of federal statutes and regula-
tions, not on problems caused by the preemption of state laws.217 
restraint reflecting the restraints of political forces." HENKIN, supra note 33, at 70. Passage 
ofthe Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 removed any remaining limits. With one stroke, 
the balance between state and federal powers toppled. Prior to the amendment's passage, 
the individual state governments elected their two senators, thereby ensuring a state voice 
in the federal government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c1. 1. Clause one of the Seventeenth 
Amendment withdrew the states' check on the federal government, and ever since, state 
governments have had to rely on persuasion and the few minor constitutional provisions 
preserving their sovereign police powers. See, e.g., U.S. CON ST. amends. X, XI. 
214 Bruce Stokes, GAIT Going, 22 NAT'L J. 1150, 1151 (May 12, 1990). 
215 Wigglesworth Interview, supra note 7. 
216 See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 96, Wist Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONGo REC. S1761-62 (daily 
ed. Feb. 27,1990) ("urging" administration to refrain from submitting any GATS proposal 
to Congress that included civil air transport services); All Services Must be Included in GATS, 
EC Insists, FIN. TIMEs,June 19, 1990, § I, at 4. 
217 See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 96, WIst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONGo REC. S1761-62 (daily 
ed. Feb. 27,1990) (inclusion of air transport services in GATS "would eliminate the long 
standing statutory laws on ownership and control" provided by the Federal Aviation Act 
of 1958). 
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2. The Executive Branch 
Like Congress, the executive branch has considered the con-
cerns of special interests. Indeed, in response to special interest 
pressure, the USTR has shown indications of retracting its pro-
posal to completely preempt the telecommunications,218 trans-
portation,219 securities,220 and banking sectors.221 More so than 
Congress, however, the USTR has paid attention to the interests 
of the states. On March 3, 1990 the USTR distributed a ques-
tionnaire to the fifty states asking their governors to answer a 
series of questions concerning state regulation of the banking, 
securities, and other industries.222 The USTR is compiling this 
information, along with other information and voluntary sub-
missions by concerned parties, and will report it to the Presi-
dent.223 While the results are not yet public, preliminary indica-
tions from states which have replied show no significant 
opposition to GATS and its preemption of state law.224 
Not all states have fully replied, however.225 In anticipation of 
significant conflicts with state legislation such as New York's fi-
nancial laws, Hawaii's tourism regulations, and Delaware's cor-
porate statutes, the USTR has suggested that the United States 
may utilize article 22 of the proposed GATS. Article 22 permits 
a party to enter a state-specific reservation after ratification, 
thereby exempting such state law from GATS's preemptive ef-
218 u.s. Pushes for Greater Political Commitment in Last Months of GAIT Talks, 181 Daily 
Rep. Execs. (BNA) at A-7 (Sept. 18, 1990). 
219 GAIT Negotiators Edge Toward Compromise on Schedule, No Major Initiatives Offered, 
144 Daily Rep. Execs. (BNA) at A-1O (july 26, 1990). 
220 Negotiating Group on Services Debate Trade Liberaliwtion, Abolition of Barriers, 122 Daily 
Rep. Execs. (BNA) at A-9 (june 25, 1990). 
221 USTR Hills, U.S. Banking Delegation at GAIT Talks on Trade in Services, 180 Daily 
Rep. Execs. (BNA) at A-8 (Sept. 17, 1990). 
222 Richardson Interview, supra note 8. 
m Investigation Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,728 (1990) (entitled "Compilation and iden-
tification of U.S. Measures that May Not Conform with Principles the United States is 
Seeking in the Uruguay Round"). At the time of this Article's publication, the USTR had 
not released this report. 
224 Interview with Confidential Source A, (transcript on file with the Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review); Letter from Margaret Spearman, Director, 
Office of State Development, State of Texas (Nov. I, 1990) (disclosing Texas's answers to 
USTR questionnaire) (on file with the Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review); Letter from Governor Joe Frank Harris, State of Georgia (Nov. 2, 1990) (dis-
closing Georgia's answers to USTR questionnaire) (on file with the Boston College Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review). 
225 Richardson Interview, supra note 8. 
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fects. 226 The USTR intimated that the United States might put 
forth such a state-specific reservation prior to ratification of 
GATS.227 This suggestion, however, generated international po-
litical fallout. Thus, to avoid altogether the problem of preempt-
ing significant state laws, the USTR proposed that state laws be 
conformed to GATS.228 In this way, the states would maintain 
their enforcement powers while bowing to de facto federal leg-
islation-the laws which the states enforce will be either federally 
or internationally drafted. 
The Bush Administration's attitude toward the preemption 
problem is mixed, at best. While information gathering takes 
place, the executive branch lacks a clear policy toward the possible 
preemptive effects of GATS. One administration official charac-
terizes the GATS debate as a "petty turf war" between the Com-
merce and Treasury Departments.229 Another official describes a 
USTR caught in the middle as completely "paralyzed."230 Addi-
tionally, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu opposes GATS 
preemption of state law. Thus USTR officials describe the exec-
utive branch's position on preemption as "unsure" and "dead-
locked."231 
B. At the State Level 
Curiously, the states also seem disinterested in the preemption 
issue. Whether this lack of interest is attributable to a genuine 
lack of concern about the diminution of state regulatory power 
or a resignation to the lack of real constitutional clout is uncer-
tain.232 Whichever is true, the lack of alarm may signal acquies-
cence to the federal government's and the international com-
munity'S desire to implement GATS. 
226 Id. Article 22 does not, however, permit complete exemption from GATS's preemp-
tive effects. 
227 Id. For a discussion of the permissibility and effect of pre-ratification reservations, 
see John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State 
Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372 (1980). 
228 Richardson Interview, supra note 8. 
229 Telephone Interview with Confidential Source B, (Sept. 14, 1990) (transcript on file 
with the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review). 
230 Telephone Interview with Confidential Source C, (Sept. 14, 1990) (transcript on file 
with the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review). 
231 Id. The Administration's indifference is said to apply to the Uruguay Round in 
general, but has also been specifically attributed to GATS. 
232 See supra note 213. 
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1. The Governors 
Wisconsin Governor Tommy G. Thompson has acknowledged 
that the "[s]tates operate within a national economic and foreign 
policy framework provided at the federallevel,"233 but has added 
that the "[g]overnors ... are concerned" about the multilateral 
trade negotiations.234 According to Governor Thompson, "to en-
sure that state interests are not severely compromised, it will be 
important for states to determine priorities and consult closely 
with U.S. negotiators."235 Consultation about undetermined 
priorities, however, hardly sounds a clarion cry to battle against 
federal encroachment upon states rights. 
The National Governors Association has done little more than 
repeat Governor Thompson's call for consultation. The associa-
tion has affirmatively expressed its approval of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations on trade in services,236 while at the same time 
reminding the federal government that it should solicit state in-
put: 
Because of the special state regulatory role, it is imperative 
that the federal government continue to consult fully with 
state regulators on international rules affecting service in-
dustries and that state views be incorporated in the U.S. 
negotiating position. The federal government should work 
with states to develop mechanisms to keep Governors in-
formed on and to solicit their input for any bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations on international trade in services.237 
The governors realize that they have no trump cards when they 
disagree with or merely question federal foreign trade policy.238 
Indeed, the governors have little formal input into the GATS 
decision-making process. The governors can be heard through 
the USTR's Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee (IG-
PAC). IGPAC is a panel of thirty-five governors, mayors, state 
legislators, and other state and local officials that advises the 
233 Tommy G. Thompson, Going Global: A Governor's Perspective, INTERGOV'TAL PERSP., 
Spring 1990, at 15. 
23. Id. at 17. 
235 Id. 
236 National Governors Association Trade Commission Conference Report, Feb. 23, 
1990, at 6. 
237 /d. 
238 Telephone Interview with Confidential Source D, (July 19, 1990) (transcript on file 
with the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review). 
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USTR on a range of trade concerns. It has declared its "vigorous 
support" for "GATT rules on trade in services."239 
2. State Legislators 
While state legislators also seek to contribute to the GATS 
decision-making process, few formal mechanisms are available 
for them to be heard. To date, only one state legislator sits on 
IGPAC.240 Moreover, IGPAC is effectively the sole avenue for 
expression of the state legislators' views on GATS preemption. 
The National Conference of State Legislators has delayed issuing 
a policy statement on GATS preemption until the USTR releases 
the results of its state services survey.241 This delay essentially 
leaves the state legislators without a voice in the GATS process 
for the foreseeable future. 242 
C. Lobbies and Special Interests 
In addition to federal and state governments, special interests 
have also voiced concern about the preemptive effects of GATS. 
The U.S. service industry has been characterized as "the single 
most important driving force in launching this round of multi-
lateral negotiations."243 The service industry's input is significant 
because it initially supported GATS broadly and possesses potent 
lobbying prowess. 
While the individual service sectors do take stands on state law 
preemption, their stands often vary by industry, and sometimes 
by corporation. Moreover, most individual pressure groups have 
not considered the preemption question. The Coalition for Ser-
vice Industries, a conglomeration of service industries banded 
together to aid in international economic discourse, has, however, 
considered and stated its position. The Coalition seeks a preemp-
239 Statement of the USTR Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade 
(IGPAC), July 31, 1990, at 1, 2; Telephone Interview with Katelino Echevary, Office of 
the USTR (Aug. 9, 1990). 
240 New Jersey Assemblyman Chuck Hardwick sits on the 35 member IGPAC panel. 
Statement of IGPAC, July 31, 1990, at 3. 
241 Telephone Interview with Karen Britto, National Conference of State Legislators 
(Aug. 14, 1990). 
242 The results of the questionnaires may never be released to the public. Richardson 
Interview, supra note 8. 
243 GATT Going, supra note 214, at 1151. 
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tion-neutral GATS.244 Such an agreement would relieve states of 
their regulatory authority and bring about uniform legislation 
through sector-specific GATS provisions.245 The Coalition's po-
sition seems to reflect the general view of many service indus-
tries.246 
Lobbies tend to range from neutral to receptive to state law 
preemption by GATS. Some lobbies see the upcoming promise 
of uniformity as beneficial to U.S. interests.247 Other lobbies see 
the outcome of the preemption debate as superfluous, because 
"everyone will either take a hit or walk away happy."248 There 
are, however, some lobbies which see the possibility of state reg-
ulatory preemption as calamitous. In their words, "uniformity is 
[facially] good, [but] there should be an overriding purpose of 
shoring up state regulatory authority to preserve the myriad 
industries' long-term integrities."249 Other lobbyists have more 
bluntly stated their position: "We are not pushing preemption of 
state law."250 
CONCLUSION 
There appear to be few constitutional obstacles to enactment 
of GATS, although political hurdles remain. Analysis of cases 
decided under the Commerce Clause indicates that the federal 
government can preempt inconsistent state law regulating those 
service sectors GATS is likely to cover. Additionally, analysis of 
cases assessing the validity of treaties and agreements similar to 
GATS indicates that if GATS comports with necessary constitu-
tional procedures, courts would uphold it as the supreme law of 
244 Wigglesworth Interview, supra note 7. Accord, Telephone Interview with Kevin 
Cronin, Washington Counsel, National Association of Insurance Commissioners (Nov. 6, 
1990) [hereinafter Cronin Interview] (most state regulation is "prudential," and is there-
fore quasi-reserved under GATS proposal). 
245 Cronin Interview, supra note 244. 
246 E.g., Hawley Interview, supra note 7; Telephone Interview with Lisa Lamas, Asso-
ciate Director of Governmental Affairs, American Express, Inc. (Nov. 2, 1990) [herein-
after Lamas Interview]; Telephone Interviews with Emily Brooks Rothrock, Associate 
Director, American International Group, Inc. (Apr. 6, and Oct. 25, 1990). 
247 Wigglesworth Interview, supra note 7; Lamas Interview, supra note 246. 
248 Telephone Interview with Confidential Source E, (date withheld by request) (tran-
script on file with the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review). 
249 Telephone Interview with Confidential Source F, (date withheld by request) (tran-
script on file with the Boston College International and Comparative Law Review). 
250 Telephone interview with Bradley Smith, Counsel on Legislative Affairs, Interna-
tional Insurance Council (Nov. 2, 1990). 
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the land. Thus, GATS can preempt inconsistent state law. Finally, 
political forces at the federal level appear to be at odds over the 
extent to which GATS should preempt state law. There is, how-
ever, little organized resistance to preemption at the state level. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that GATS can be enacted and 
enjoy full domestic effect in the United States. 
